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RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd 
[2014] SGCA 62: Restatement of Law Relating to 
Misrepresentation in Singapore 
 
The recent Court of Appeal decision of RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture 
Pte Ltd [2014] SGCA 62 (“RBC Properties”) contains an invaluable restatement 
of the law relating to misrepresentation in Singapore. This entry aims only to 
summarise that restatement of law. The interested reader may find the facts of 
the case succinctly discussed by the Court of Appeal in its judgment here and 
also in this blog entry on the High Court decision. 
 
The Court of Appeal dealt with three important issues relating to the law of 
misrepresentation, namely: 
 When a representor can rely on the defence of reasonable belief under s 
2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed); 
 The type of damages recoverable under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation 
Act; and 
 The remedy for an innocent misrepresentation, particularly with regard 
to s 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 
 
When a representor can rely on the defence of reasonable belief 
under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 
 
Assuming that a representor had made a misrepresentation, and the 
representee has suffered loss, the representor will be liable under the common 
law: the contract entered into can be rescinded, accompanied by an indemnity 
in favour of the representee. Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act affords 
the representee an additional statutory remedy. It provides that: 
 
Where a person has entered into a contract after a 
misrepresentation has been made to him by another party thereto 
and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if the person 
making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in 
respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made 
fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that 
the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he 
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proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe 
up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented 
were true. 
 
Section 2(1) therefore entitles the representee to damages had the 
misrepresentation been made fraudulently. However, the representor can 
escape the effects of s 2(1) by relying on the defence of reasonable belief, also 
provided by the subsection itself. The representor must show that “that he had 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was 
made that the facts represented were true”. The Court of Appeal in RBC 
Properties laid down several important principles relating to when a 
representor can rely on such a defence of reasonable belief. 
 
Relationship between s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act and the tort of 
negligent misstatement 
 
By way of background, the Court of Appeal first observed that while s 2(1) co-
exists with the tort of negligent misrepresentation at common law established 
in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd[1964] AC 465, s 2(1) is 
decidedly different from the common law action. The Court of Appeal adopted 
Professor John Cartwright’s explanation of the differences between the two 
actions as follows: 
 
… Broadly, the remedy under section 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 is more restricted in its application, 
since it is only available to one contracting party against the other 
contracting party, whereas the tort of negligence applies to all 
cases where a claimant can establish a duty of care, including 
actions between contracting parties. But in those case where 
section 2(1) applies it is more attractive for the claimant since 
the elements of his claim are easier to establish than the elements 
of the tort of negligence; the burden of proving (in substance) 
absence of negligence lies on the defendant (rather than, as in 
the tort of negligence, the burden of proving breach of duty lying 
on the claimant); and in certain circumstances the remedy of 
damages under the section might be more extensive than the 
remedy in negligence. It is therefore clear that, where the 
claimant has a cause of action under section 2(1), it is unlikely to 
be of any benefit to him to pursue any action he may have in the 
tort of negligence. But the tort will be used where the Act is not 
available; in particular, where the claimant and the defendant are 
not parties to a contract. [emphasis added by the Court of Appeal 
in RBC Properties] 
 
In summary, s 2(1) is generally more advantageous to the representee if there 
is a contract between the representor and representee. The statutory action is 
more advantageous because the burden of proof is now on the representor to 
prove reasonable belief, and if he fails to do so, the representee may recover 
greater damages compared to the common law action. 
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Application of the test of reasonable belief 
 
The Court of Appeal explained comprehensively how the test of reasonable 
belief is to be applied by way of a defence in a s 2(1) action. In summary, the 
court must ascertain the representor’s subjective state of mind based on an 
objective standard. This is to be done in two steps: 
 First, the court must objectively ascertain that the representor’s 
subjectively believed that the representation made was true. 
 Secondly, having ascertained that the representor subjectively believed 
that the representation made was true, the court must objectively assess 
whether the representor had reasonable grounds for that belief. 
 
As for the first step, the court must not subjectively ascertain the representor’s 
belief that the representation was true, for this would make it all too easy for a 
representor to simply assert that he had truly believed in what he had 
represented. The facts of the case must be objectively assessed to ascertain 
whether the representor did, subjectively, believe that the representation made 
was true. As the Court of Appeal explained, it is the element 
of reasonableness that constitutes the objective element in the application of s 
2(1).  
 
As for the second step, the court must objectively assess whether the 
representor had reasonable grounds for that belief. According to the Court of 
Appeal in RBC Properties, “the court would have to assess the reasonableness 
of the representor’s alleged belief in the context of both the representation(s) 
made as well as all the circumstances of the case, and what is reasonable will 
inevitably be, in the nature of things, a fact-centric exercise”. Although the 
Court of Appeal rightly held that no hard and fast line can be drawn, it did hold 
that the general premise behind s 2(1) is that representor’s subjectively held 
belief has fallen short of what, in the relevant circumstances, would have been 
objectively reasonable for him to believe. 
 
The Court of Appeal added four further, specific, points flowing from the above-
mentioned two-step analysis: 
 First, the representor is not entitled to claim innocence when he was 
wilfully blind to obvious sources of information that would have brought 
him to a realisation of the true position. This is entirely consistent with 
the Court of Appeal’s prior explanation that the assessment of 
reasonable belief is to be done objectively.  
 Secondly, the representor is only entitled to rely on grounds that were 
actually (and hence, subjectively) present in the representor’s mind at 
the time he made the representation concerned. Thus, the representor is 
not entitled to rely on grounds that he says a reasonable person would 
have had in the circumstances.  
 Thirdly, the operative timeframe for when such reasonable belief is to be 
subjectively held commences from the time the misrepresentation was 
made, up till when the contract is entered into.  
 Fourthly, and related to the third point, the assessment of reasonable 
belief is a continuing one throughout the operative timeframe. Thus, 
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even if the representor had an objectively reasonable ground at first, that 
would not assist him if such ground became unreasonable later on within 
the operative timeframe.  
 
Therefore, the analysis of reasonable belief under s 2(1), under the Court of 
Appeal’s restatement in RBC Properties, proceeds along a two-step general 
framework, as supplemented by these four specific points. 
 
The type of damages recoverable under s 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 
 
Although not specifically raised by the facts in RBC Properties, the Court of 
Appeal also very helpfully discussed the controversial issue of the type of 
damages recoverable under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act. Briefly, the 
controversy is whether the measure of damages is dictated by a fraudulent or 
negligent measure. This is practically significant: whereas the negligent 
measure is constrained by foreseeability, the fraudulent measure is not, and can 
lead to significant damages.  
 
The Court of Appeal very tentatively held that the measure of damages under s 
2(1) should be that awarded under the negligent measure. It thought that the 
substance of s 2(1) was negligence, and hence the more generous measure 
awarded in respect of fraud should not apply. This is decidedly against the 
English Court of Appeal decision of Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 
297, which has been cited with apparent approval by the High Court in 
Singapore. However, this was not in issue in RBC Properties, and the Court of 
Appeal did not see it necessary to express a definitive view on the matter. 
 
The remedy for an innocent misrepresentation, particularly with 
regard to s 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 
 
A final, but no less important, point from RBC Properties concerns the remedy 
for an innocent misrepresentation. There are two related issues here. 
 
Rescission with indemnity 
 
The Court of Appeal found that where a misrepresentation is made innocently, 
that is, the reasonable belief test in s 2(1) is satisfied, the representee is entitled 
to both rescind the contract, and claim an indemnity. However, it is important 
the representee is placed in the same position before the contract was entered 
into in all aspects, but only as regards those obligations created by the contract 
entered into as a result of the misrepresentation. This is the essence of the 
indemnity.  
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Damages in lieu of rescission 
 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal in RBC Properties explained the application of 
ss 2(2) and 2(3) of the Misrepresentation Act, which give the court the 
discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission: 
 
(2)  Where a person has entered into a contract after a 
misrepresentation has been made to him otherwise than 
fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by reason of the 
misrepresentation, to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed, 
in any proceedings arising out of the contract, that the contract 
ought to be or has been rescinded, the court or arbitrator may 
declare the contract subsisting and award damages in lieu of 
rescission, if of opinion that it would be equitable to do so, having 
regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the loss that 
would be caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as to the 
loss that rescission would cause to the other party. 
 
(3)  Damages may be awarded against a person under 
subsection (2) whether or not he is liable to damages under 
subsection (1), but where he is so liable any award under 
subsection (2) shall be taken into account in assessing his liability 
under subsection (1). 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the discretion conferred by s 2(2) is to be 
exercised only in accordance with established principles. An important 
consideration is whether rescission is a disproportionately harsh remedy on the 
representor, in the event that the representation was relatively slight or 
unimportant. In such a case, damages might be the more appropriately remedy. 
 
 
Goh Yihan (Associate Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Goh Yihan, "RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu 
Furniture Pte Ltd [2014] SGCA 62: Restatement of Law Relating to 
Misrepresentation in Singapore", Singapore Law Blog (23 December 2014) 
(http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/71) 
